The U.S. military lost satellite internet in Taiwan this week.
I’ve written about Taiwan, and the risks to its internet infrastructure during wartime. Background: China could sever Taiwan’s internet access during an invasion. Satellite internet providers, like Starlink, could serve as a backup. But Taiwan does not trust Elon Musk. As a result, the Taiwanese government is currently building its own satellite internet infrastructure.
Nevertheless, the U.S., Taiwan’s key ally, relies on Musk’s Starlink—or, more specifically, on Starshield, a Starlink-powered satellite service that vends to the U.S. military.
Musk asserts that Starshield can operate independently of Starlink, ensuring that decisions affecting Starlink, such as geofencing, won't impact Starshield's service to the U.S. military.
Well… This week, U.S. troops stationed in Taiwan noticed that Starshield wasn’t working. Now, the U.S. House China Committee is demanding answers.
Why is Starshield off in Taiwan?
Is this an intentional ploy by Musk to help China and hurt the U.S.? I doubt it. More likely, Starlink is geofenced in Taiwan (yes, likely to please the PRC), and a configuration mixup caused Starshield, which is nominally separate, to also geofence Taiwan. I imagine the issue will be resolved shortly.
The issue is not that Elon Musk has severed internet access to the U.S. military. It’s that he could. His promises to the military about Starshield’s operational independence from Starlink are—and always have been—suspect.
Private interests, public consequences
But the issue is broader than this standoff with Musk over Starshield.
The broader issue is that powerful, sovereign nations—even the U.S.—must rely on private companies to achieve their strategic goals. Nations’ incentives do not always align with the incentives of companies in their jurisdiction. As a result, private technology companies, including Starshield, wield power over states—occasionally, they wield state-like power themselves.
What are we going to do about that?
In other news…
Internet connectivity isn’t the only threat to Taiwan. Chinese APTs (Advanced Persistent Threats) have been luring Taiwanese targets with malware disguised as intelligence about Chinese strategies for a Taiwanese invasion.